Hitler to the Reichstag, 7 March 1936

“We dedicate ourselves to achieving an understanding between the peoples of Europe and particularly an understanding with our Western peoples and neighbors. After three years, I believe that, with the present day, the struggle for German equal rights can be regarded as closed…. We have no territorial claims to make in Europe.” (Following this speech, Hitler dissolved the Reichstag.)

The Rhineland challenge 

The Rhineland in western Germany is bordered by the River Rhine in the east and France and the Benelux countries in the west. It includes the industrial Ruhr Valley, the famous cities of Aachen, Bonn, Cologne, Düsseldorf, Essen, Koblenz, Mannheim and Weissbaden, and several bridgeheads into Germany proper. 

After the end of the First World War, the Rhineland was occupied by the victorious Allies. Though the occupation was set to last through 1935, military forces withdrew in 1930 as a good-will gesture to the Weimar Republic. The Allies retained the right to reoccupy the Rhineland should Germany violate the Treaty of Versailles. 

In March 1936, a few thousand German troops marched into the Rhineland while the populace waved swastika flags. The soldiers had orders to “turn back and not to resist” if challenged by the all-dominant French Army. Hitler later said that the forty-eight hours following his action were the tensest of his life.

Churchill’s defenders correctly cite the Rhineland as confirming his warnings about Hitler. But what Churchill actually proposed to do about it is not as clear.

“Confronted by terrible circumstances” 

In January 1936, Churchill predicted that a Rhineland incursion would raise “a very grave European issue…. The League of Nations Union folk, who have done their best to get us disarmed, may find themselves confronted by terrible circumstances.”

Hitler’s future foreign minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, recorded how Hitler conceived of slipping the occupation past the Western allies. Summoning Ribbentrop in January, Hitler said: “[I]t occurred to me last night how we can occupy the Rhineland without any friction. We return to the League!” Germany had left the League of Nations in 1933.  

Ribbentrop said he too (of course) had this very idea. He suggested they strike while the French and British were on one of their weekend holidays. Hitler acted on Saturday March 7th. France, he said had abrogated the Rhineland agreements by a military alliance with Russia. 

True to plan, Hitler added a sweetener, proposing “a real pacification of Europe between states that are equal in rights.” Germany would return to the League of Nations, provided her colonies, stripped at Versailles, were returned. 

Would France march? 

The question turned on France. Would she reassert control of the Rhineland? Or just dither and do nothing? Anthony Eden, Britain’s foreign secretary, was sanguine: Great Britain would stand by France, and he offered military staff conversations. 

Unfortunately for staff conversations, the French military was led by General Maurice Gamelin, a “nondescript fonctionnaire.” The French government may have yearned for a way to stop Hitler. Gamelin and his military colleagues were more worried about stopping him from invading France proper.

British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin believed France was unwilling to act—with or without Britain. Churchill was unsure, given the resolve of French Foreign Minister Pierre Flandin. Four days after Hitler’s action Flandin visited London. Churchill recalled: 

He told me he proposed to demand from the British Government simultaneous mobilisation of the land, sea, and air forces of both countries, and that he had received assurances of support from all the nations of the “Little Entente” [Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia] and from other States. He read out an impressive list of the replies received. There was no doubt that superior strength still lay with the Allies of the former war. They had only to act to win.

Baldwin’s reluctance 

Churchill urged Flandin to press his views with Baldwin, who was unsympathetic. He knew little of foreign affairs, he said, but he did know the British people wanted peace. Flandin modified his plea. Suppose the Anglo-French “invite” Hitler to leave, pending negotiations, which would probably restore the Rhineland to Germany anyway? Even this was too risky for Baldwin. “I have not the right to involve England,” he said. “Britain is not in a state to go to war.” Flandin was deflated, and as Baldwin suspected, the French cabinet was divided.

The pressure in Britain to avoid action was strong. At a dinner of ex-servicemen in Leicester, one of Churchill’s supporters, Leo Amery, gave a fiery speech. Britain’s very existence was threatened, he exclaimed. To the amazement of one observer, the ex-servicemen sided with the Germans. They said in effect: Why shouldn’t they have their own territory back? It’s no concern of ours.

“No fresh perplexities” 

Publicly, Churchill was being cautious. “I was careful not to diverge in the slightest degree from my attitude of severe though friendly criticism of Government policy,” he wrote. The friendliness is more evident than the severity. Churchill did urge a “coordinated plan” under the League of Nations to help France challenge the German action. This was denied. Sir Samuel Hoare replied that the necessary participants in such a plan were “totally unprepared from a military point of view.” 

Churchill had political reasons for treading lightly. He had been urging creation of a Ministry of Defense or Supply, which he hoped to be named to head. Baldwin duly announced a “Minister for the Coordination of Defense,” which was something less entirely. Worse, the job went to Solicitor General Sir Thomas Inskip, who knew nothing of the subject. 

Inskip’s appointment disappointed Churchill, who, hoping to be called to office, had carefully avoided public criticism of the government. Baldwin, Churchill reminisced, “thought, no doubt, that he had dealt me a politically fatal stroke, and I felt he might well be right.”

Churchill as peacemaker 

But Churchill still had an audience. He now began a series of fortnightly articles on foreign affairs for the Evening Standard. In the first, “Britain, Germany and Locarno,” he renewed his call for League of Nations intercession on the Rhineland. He insisted that there was a peaceful way to resolve the problem: 

The Germans claim that the Treaty of Locarno has been ruptured by the Franco-Soviet pact. That is their case and it is one that should be argued before the World Court at The Hague. The French have expressed themselves willing to submit this point to arbitration and to abide by the result. Germany should be asked to act in the same spirit and to agree. If the German case is good and the World Court pronounces that the Treaty of Locarno has been vitiated by the Franco-Soviet pact, then clearly the German action, although utterly wrong in method, can not be seriously challenged by the League of Nations.

This is not Churchill the defiant critic of appeasement, but Churchill the statesman. At this point he was urging prudence and adjudication. He did warn that if the League failed in its duty, it might cause events to “slide remorselessly downhill towards the pit in which Western civilization might be fatally engulfed.”  

He continued to urge strength and resolution: “I desire to see the collective forces of the world invested with overwhelming power. If you are going to depend on a slight margin, one way or the other, you will have war.”

Collective Security 

Churchill’s next article returned to his theme of unified action. This was no task for France and Britain alone, he declared. It was a task for all: “There may still be time. Let the States and people who lie in fear of Germany carry their alarms to the League of Nations at Geneva.” In the absence of French military action he was falling back on Collective Security. 

Aside from political considerations, Churchill was attempting to see things from the view of Britain’s closest ally. The French were “afraid of the Germans,” he wrote to The Times; France had joined the sanctions against Italy over Mussolini’s 1935 invasion of Abyssinia, and the resulting estrangement had given Hitler his Rhineland opportunity: 

In fact Mr. Baldwin’s Government, from the very highest motives, endorsed by the country at the General Election, has, without helping Abyssinia at all, got France into grievous trouble which has to be compensated by the precise engagement of our armed forces. Surely in the light of these facts, undisputed as I deem them to be, we might at least judge the French, with whom our fortunes appear to be so decisively linked, with a reasonable understanding….

Did Churchill waver? 

Winston Churchill favored a collective response to the Rhineland, recognizing its implications. One event followed the other, as the hardline Member of Parliament Robert Boothby recorded later:   

The military occupation of the Rhineland separated France from her allies in Eastern Europe. The occupation of Austria isolated Czechoslovakia. The betrayal of Czechoslovakia by the West isolated Poland. The defeat of Poland isolated France. The defeat of France isolated Britain. If Britain had been defeated, the United States would have been given true and total isolation for the first time.

Churchill certainly would have backed French reoccupation of the Rhineland. But evidence suggests that he knew the League was toothless. Churchill’s theme did not dramatically change in 1936; it merely evolved. As early as 1933 he had declared:  “Whatever way we turn there is risk. But the least risk and the greatest help will be found in re-creating the Concert of Europe.”

That was not to be. The failure of a concerted response over the Rhineland was to be repeated. Each time western statesmen hoped the latest Hitler inroad would be his last.

Prudence and statesmanship 

It is the belief of many thoughtful historians that Churchill said and did nothing about the Rhineland, even in the weeks after he had been denied office. His actions are more complex than that. He did give mixed signals, but he also proposed solutions. When France refused unilateral action, he favored collective action. His public declarations were hardly a clarion call. But we must bear in mind also that he was not in office.  

Churchill never admired Hitler, except in the narrow sense of Hitler’s political skills. There is no doubt that he spoke well of Mussolini, up to 1940. Was this because he admired Fascism, or because he hoped to influence the Italian dictator? Until the mid-1930s, Italo-German relations were precarious.

The Rhineland marked Churchill’s final disillusionment over the League of Nations. It impelled his efforts to secure Collective Security through “a coalition of the willing” (to use a more recent and perhaps uncomfortable phrase). The problem was that the willing were few—and demonstrably unwilling to cooperate. 

Author’s note 

This essay appeared in longer form in my book, Churchill and the Avoidable War: Could World War II Have Been Prevented? (2015). It was prompted years before by Robert Rhodes James’s argument that Churchill said and did nothing to stop Hitler over the Rhineland. I argued otherwise, and he kindly agreed to hear me out. Alas my piece appeared too late for his lifetime, and cost me his almost certain learned response. I miss my friend. RML 

Related articles

“Great Contemporaries: The Three Lives of Churchill’s Hitler Essays,” 2024.

“Robert Rhodes James: ‘A Good House of Commons Man,” 2023.

“Churchill and the Avoidable War,” 2015.

“Was the Second World War Avoidable?,” 2015.

Churchill and the Avoidable War

Preface

This book examines Churchill’s theory that “timely action” could have forced Hitler to recoil, and a devastating catastrophe avoided. We consider his proposals, and the degree to which he pursued them. Churchill was both right and wrong. He was right that Hitler could have been stopped. He was wrong in not doing all he could to stop him. The result is a corrective to traditional arguments, both of Churchill’s critics and defenders. Whether the war was avoidable hangs on these issues.

Chapter 1. Germany Arming:  Encountering Hitler, 1930-34

“There is no difficulty at all in having cordial relations between the peoples….But never will you have friendship with the present German Government. You must have diplomatic and correct relations, but there can never be friendship between the British democracy and the Nazi power….That power cannot ever be the trusted friend of the British democracy.” —Churchill, 1934

Some claim Churchill was “for Hitler before he was against him.” To say he admired Hitler is true in one abstract sense. He admired the Führer’s political skill, his ability to dominate and to lead. With his innate optimism he even hoped briefly that Hitler might “mellow.” But in his broad understanding of Hitler, Churchill was right all along: dead right.

Chapter 2. Germany Armed: “Hitler and His Choice,” 1935-36

Recently [Hitler] has offered many words of reassurance, eagerly lapped up by those who have been so tragically wrong about Germany in the past.  —Churchill, 1935

It is widely stated that Churchill admired Hitler, to the point of suggesting that if Britain had been defeated it could have benefitted from someone like him. Herein we examine Churchill’s contentious essay, “Hitler and His Choice,” in the Strand Magazine, 1935. We also evaluate Churchill’s mid-1930s warnings of the perils of disarmament.

Chapter 3. The Rhineland :“They had only to act to win,” 1936

“Mr. Baldwin explained [to French Foreign Minister Flandin] that although he knew little of foreign affairs he was able to interpret accurately the feelings of the British people. And they wanted peace. M. Flandin says that he rejoined that the only way to ensure this was to stop Hitlerite aggression while such action was still possible.” —Churchill, 1948

Churchill later stated that Hitler could have been stopped when he marched into the Rhineland in 1936. This on the evidence is true. At the time, though, Churchill failed to press the issue. Hoping for office under Baldwin, who had become prime minister once again, he chose not to buck his party’s leader, clinging to a hope that the French would act alone; but they would not move without tacit British support.

Chapter 4. Derelict State: The Austrian Anschluss, 1938

            “Europe is confronted with a programme of aggression, nicely calculated and timed, unfolding stage by stage, and there is only one choice open, not only to us, but to other countries who are unfortunately concerned—either to submit, like Austria, or else to take effective measures while time remains….” —Churchill, 1938

In 1935 Hitler assured Austria of her independence. In February 1938 he summoned the Austrian Chancellor in February 1938, demanding appointment of a Nazi Interior and Security Minister. In London, The Times stated that “no one but a fanatic” would believe this meant a “Nazified Austria.” A month later, Hitler proclaimed an Anschluss, or union with Austria. Churchill did not see this coming, though he had warned in a general sense, and his prescience was justified. Czechoslovakia, he predicted, would Hitler’s next conquest.

Chapter 5. Munich’s Mortal Follies, October 1938

            “Silent, mournful, abandoned, broken, Czechoslovakia recedes into the darkness….I do not grudge our loyal, brave people, who were ready to do their duty no matter what the cost….but they should know the truth. They should know that there has been gross neglect and deficiency in our defences; they should know that we have sustained a defeat without a war, the consequences of which will travel far with us along our road.” —Churchill, 1938

The Munich agreement, which entrenched Hitler in power and gave him Czechoslovakia with its military factories, is held today the classic example of fatal appeasement. Yet a curious narrative has evolved that Munich was actually wise, since it gave the Allies another year to arm. Less often remarked is that it also gave Germany another year, and even German sources agree the Nazis were less formidable in 1938. What was there about fighting them in 1939-40 that made it preferable? Was it Hitler’s eradication of Poland in three weeks, the Low Countries in sixteen days, France in six weeks? This chapter also examines the credible 1938 plot to overthrow Hitler. After Munich the plotters despaired. Most were later executed.

Chapter 6. “Favourable Reference to the Devil”:

The Russian Enigma, 1938-39

            “I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma: but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest. —Churchill, 1939

As Churchill predicted, Munich sealed Czechoslovakia’s fate. In mid-March 1939, Czech President Emil Hácha, threatened with the bombing of Prague, agreed to German occupation of the rest of his country, which was renamed the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia—an arrangement which “in its unctuous mendacity was remarkable even for the Nazis.” This chapter examines Churchill’s evaluation of the Soviet versus Nazi danger; his conclusion that the latter was the greater threat; his urgent efforts to encourage an understanding with the Russians; and the rebuff his prescriptions received by the British (and to some extent the Soviet) government.

 Chapter 7. Lost Best Hope: The America Factor, 1918-41

            “America should have minded her own business….If you hadn’t entered the war the Allies would have made peace with Germany in the Spring of 1917….there would have been no collapse in Russia followed by Communism, no breakdown in Italy followed by Fascism, and Germany would not have signed the Versailles Treaty, which has enthroned Nazism in Germany.”

Google this alleged 1936 quotation and you’ll find a half dozen citations unquestioningly attributing it to Churchill—a striking reversal of his off-stated view that America could not avoid “world responsibility.” As World War II approached these alleged words resurfaced. Churchill sued the perpetrator and won. How he handled this peculiar case illustrates his consistent belief that the United States could not isolate itself—and that with American support the war could have been prevented.

Chapter 8. Was World War II Preventable?

“Embalm, cremate and bury—take no risks!”

“Here is a line of milestones to disaster. Here is a catalogue of surrenders, at first when all was easy and later when things were harder, to the ever-growing German power. But now at last was the end of British and French submission. Here was decision at last, taken at the worst possible moment and on the least satisfactory ground, which must surely lead to the slaughter of tens of millions of people.” —Churchill, 1948

This chapter contrasts British, French and German rearmament between Munich and the outbreak of war. It also looks at Churchill’s failed efforts to promote collective security with Russia and the United States. It examines the lost year when Prime Minister Chamberlain rebuffed overtures by Stalin and Roosevelt. Meanwhile, Hitler secured his eastern flank with a Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact.

 Summary: What Churchill Teaches Us Today

            “The word ‘appeasement’ is not popular, but appeasement has its place in all policy. Make sure you put it in the right place. Appease the weak, defy the strong. It is a terrible thing for a famous nation like Britain to do it the wrong way round…. Appeasement in itself may be good or bad according to the circumstances. Appeasement from weakness and fear is alike futile and fatal. Appeasement from strength is magnanimous and noble and might be the surest and perhaps the only path to world peace.” —Churchill, 1952

            To her father’s admirers the late Lady Soames would always offer a commandment: “Thou shalt not say what my father would do today.” Modern situations are vastly different. The threat today is diffuse; in its totality it is by no means comparable to that embodied by Nazi Germany.

Was Churchill right that World War II was preventable? The answer is probably “yes—but with great difficulty.” Was he right that it is foolish to put off unpleasant reality “until self-preservation strikes its jarring gong”? Undoubtedly. The problem for leaders today is to judge when discretion should take priority over action, when diplomacy is yet a feasible option—and when and how to deploy a bluff.

Churchill and the Avoidable War will cost you the price of a cup of coffee. You can read it in a couple of nights.  You may then decide if Churchill was right that the Second World War could have been prevented. Click here for your copy.

Churchill called it “The Unnecessary War…. If the Allies had resisted Hitler strongly in his early stages…he would have been forced to recoil, and a chance would have been given to the sane elements in German life.”

The Second World War was the defining event of our age—the climactic clash between liberty and tyranny. It led to revolutions, the demise of empires, a protracted Cold War, and religious strife still not ended. Yet Churchill maintained that it was all avoidable.

This book is available as a Kindle Single or an illustrated paperback via Amazon USA and Amazon UK. I would be most grateful any reader posts  a short review on the Amazon pages. Just go to the Amazon page and scroll down to “reader reviews.”

For book reviews by Manfred Weidhorn, Warren Kimball and Charles Crist, please click here.

The war problem as Churchill saw it

This book examines Churchill’s argument: his prescriptions to prevent war, not in retrospect but at the time. Here are his formulas, his actions, the degree to which he pursued them. Churchill was both right and wrong. Hitler was stoppable; yet even Churchill did not do all he could to stop him. The text covers what really happened—evidence that has been “hiding in public” for many years. It is thoroughly referenced with over 200 footnotes to Churchill’s words and those of his contemporaries.

We must bear in mind that for ten years before war began Churchill was out of office. He had no plenary authority. But he did have stature, and the challenges were great. There was the rise of Hitler; the rearming of Germany; violations of the Versailles Treaty. There was the push for German hegemony, the remilitarization of the Rhineland, the Anschluss with Austria. Then came the Munich Agreement and the  seizure of Czechoslovakia. Along the way were many missed opportunities for useful relationships with Russia and America. Of course the challenges were Britain’s alone—particularly in the cases of the Rhineland and Czechoslovakia.

Churchill’s warning

It is proper to consider the lessons of the past as a guide to similar challenges now and in the future. But as Churchill wrote:

Let no one look down on those honourable, well-meaning men whose actions are chronicled in these pages, without searching his own heart, reviewing his own discharge of public duty, and applying the lessons of the past to his future conduct.

We must avoid applying the fatal decisions of the Avoidable War to today’s problems. Yet that is what we do. His words were applied from the 1948 Berlin blockade through the Cold War. More recently they were quoted over the Korean and Vietnam wars, the Suez and Cuban crises. Even more recently we heard and hear them about Palestine, North Korea, Iran, Russia, China….

Contents 

Chapter 1. Germany Arming: Encountering Hitler, 1930-34

Chapter 2. Germany Armed: “Hitler and His Choice,” 1935-36

Chapter 3. Churchill and the Rhineland: “They had only to act to win,” 1936

Chapter 4. Derelict State: The Austrian Anschluss, 1938

Chapter 5: Churchill and Munich: Lost Opportunities and Mortal Follies, October 1938

Chapter 6. “Favourable Reference to the Devil”: The Russian Enigma, 1938-39

Chapter 7. Lost Best Hope: The America Factor, 1918-41

Chapter 8. Was World War II Preventable? “Embalm, cremate and bury—take no risks!”

Summary: What Churchill Teaches Us Today

More articles on the Avoidable War

“Churchill’s Hitler Essays: He Knew the Führer from the Start,” 2024.

“Churchill’s War Memoirs: Simply Great Reading,” 2023.

“Hitler’s Sputtering Austrian Anschluss,” 2020.

“Munich Reflections: Peace for ‘A’ Time and the Case for Resistance,” 2020.

“The Indian Contribution to the Second World War,” 2017