Also I enjoyed the article on why Packard failed. The Marxists, or whatever they are calling themselves these days, have zero understanding of the entrepreneurial risk others have taken in the past to benefit the life we have today. Sadly, most have ultimately failed as times change, which I feel is the ultimate sacrifice to the cause.

The sad thing about the four Independents is that by 1955-56 they collectively only needed one competitive small body shell and OHV Six, and one competitive large body shell and OHV V8. The money they wasted going it alone could have easily produced these. Fortunately for Nash/AMC and due entirely to Romney, it had that competitive small car in the ’56 Rambler.

I don’t think there was a pure luxury play for Packard with the advent of all-steel bodies. Even in the 1920s with its wood composite bodies, Packard needed the Six for volume. The ’48 Cadillac 62 and Oldsmobile 98 shared a common body shell, economies of which set pricing for both. The 60 Special shared this shell too, moved forward 7 inches relative to rear axle, and used a unique backlight/roof cutout. A few years later, Buick replaced Oldsmobile as the sharing partner with Cadillac. For Packard to match these programs it needed to establish similar pricing bandwidth and scale, and the dealers needed a volume car.

Rereading one of the books on my bookshelf by a fine gent with initials RL… I see that Hudson spent $16M to create the ’48 Step-Downs. Three years later, Packard spent around $18.6M (“Packard 1951 To 1954” by Robert J. Neal). Given those inflationary years, the two programs were roughly equivalent in cost, so the reality was that Monobilt was no more expensive to create than BoF. As to restyling cost, again not much difference if the ’54 Hudson is any indication. And the reality was that Cadillac didn’t restyle its cars much at all from 1950-53, though it did convert the CdV to long deck for ’52.

Given that Alvan Macauley was open to merger in the late ‘40s, having allowed Mason to offer a proposal to Packard in February 1948, I can envision a scenario where Packard and Hudson merged immediately after the war, with Monobilt becoming a joint program and Briggs becoming history.

With Clipper as guidance, Packard’s styling contribution could have been to change Hudson’s traditional (and antiquated) body proportion mindset from 2-1/2 box to 3-box, the sedan’s greenhouse from 6-window to 4-window, and the sedan’s rear overhang to a longer one that used the coupe’s longer decked. The shorter roof coupe would need to sit on a shorter wheelbase if it were to share the sedan’s decklid and end panel.

Packard would have used a longer axle-to-dash to package its big Eights, and created its own front appearance and interiors, all of which would have enabled it to focus exclusively on the luxury market. Ultramatic would arrive in ’49, a V8 in ’51 if a reaction to the ’49 Olds/Cadillac V8s, or ’53 if it took ’51 Chrysler’s V8 to finally get EGB off its duff. Dealers would dual where it made sense.
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Paul- Good thoughts. These are deep waters. Doesn’t it come down to the same thing? Too many “independents” thrashing around, duplicating efforts and competing with each other. If only they’d listened to George Mason in 1948. Ah, if only! RL

Considering the success of Lincoln’s longer, lower, wider bodies for 1956, I would argue the latter. A stellar looking 1955 Packard showroom, still with Torsion-Level, would quite possibly have generated sales sufficient to finish the tooling for the V8 and launched it in ’56.

However, there were two complicating factors. The first was that Hudson had approached Packard around August 1953 expressing a willingness to merge, with Hudson the weaker bargaining partner. The second was that Chrysler informed Packard in October 1953 that it had purchased Briggs and that Packard had to exit the Conner body plant by the end of the year (that date was quickly extended to the end of 1954).

Considering everything, including the helpful addition of Hudson’s dealers, I think Packard’s best option might have been to merge with Hudson. Why? Because Hudson already had a body operation and a lower car, underpinning of which would have given the new Packard-Hudson company a running start on an all-new, lower body for ’55. Frank Spring’s X-161 4-door prototype hinted at the possibilities.

The new company would have billed itself as a marriage between the Master Motor Builder and the Master Body Builder, and the company would have had a strong case to make to investors, money of which would have helped to carry the company through a difficult 1954 model year and to tool the ’55s.

The fact that Hudson also sold a poorly designed compact car (the Jet) could have also proved helpful, its greatest value perhaps to underpin a cool looking, affordable 2+2 coupe 10 years before Mustang.

Packard-Hudson would have also been in a strong position to bargain with Nash for an advantageous merger. Or perhaps Nash would have redirected its merger energies towards fast-weakening Studebaker, with both ships quickly righted with the ’56 Rambler redesign.
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Thanks Paul, for taking the trouble to offer a thoughtful what-if. I think myself it’s unlikely. The personalities weren’t right: Nance only came to Packard because Mason told him he’d pick up Hudson while Nance got Studebaker. (If Ed Barit at Hudson approached Packard in 1953 it must have been an afterthought, since Mason had been pursuing Hudson since the late 40s.) That was the flaw in Mason’s plan, because Stude was an albatross best left out, impossible to break even. Product-wise, Hudson was in even worse shape than Packard, with a body dating three years before Packard’s and almost impossible to restyle, competing closely with the multitude of cheaper Packards—and losing dealers. The homely Hudson Jet was no competition to Rambler. Nance knew that sales-wise, a V8 was crucial, but by 1955 it was too late. If Packard had reverted to pure luxury in 1946, kept Clipper styling through 48, did your snazzy restyle in 49 and a V8 in 50, then maybe. You are astute to suggest the X-161 might have developed into a popular 2+2 sporty car well before Mustang (or the Squarebird). But it was never more than a wistful dream. I think I must now write “Why Hudson Failed.” —RML